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Introduction 
 
While Hungary’s policy towards Russia has often been interpreted in an ideological, transformative or 
opportunistic context, PM Viktor Orbán’s Eastern opening fitted relatively well into the foreign policy 
set of the early-2010s. Hungarian diplomacy turned very forcefully towards foreign economic issues, 
highlighting its utilitarian and downsizing the value-based characteristics. The economic dimension 
has prevailed at the expense of conventional diplomatic considerations. The Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry was renamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, where in the Hungarian version „Trade” 
stands before „Affairs”. Not surprisingly, the Western reception of Hungary’s good relations with 
Russia do not represent a matter of major concern in Budapest, as long as these ties are compatible 
with the general foreign policy line of the country. Hungarian foreign policy and its Russian nexus has 
been formed on a „Hungary first” basis, where national interest is defined on a narrowly utilitarian 
logic. 
In the early 2010s Russia seemed to be a desirable partner for economic cooperation. Until 2013 it 
represented the biggest non-EU trading partner and export destination for Hungary. Expectations 
were high regarding energy cooperation, Russia was perceived as a huge potential market for 
Hungarian exports, investments and potentially even other political or foreign policy benefits were 
expected to come if political relations enhance bilateral rapprochement. For PM Viktor Orbán, a 
staunch critic of Russia in opposition, it took three years after 2010 to come round and efface his past 
hostility. The new era symbolically started in January 2014, when Hungary agreed to launch the 
construction of two new nuclear blocs (Paks2) and contracted the project with Rosatom for 12.5 bln 
EUR. While the speed and suddenness of this turn was shocking for many Hungarians, the step itself 
fitted well into the emerging set of Hungarian foreign policy and economic priorities.  
 
Figure 1. Hungarian-Russian foreign trade, mln EUR, 1999-2018 
Source: Eurostat 
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Bad timing is a recurrent feature of Hungary’s Russia policy. By the time of PM Viktor Orbán’s visit to 
Moscow the Euromaidan against Victor Yanukovych was already in full swing. In just a couple of 
months Yanukovich fell, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, provoked a bloody conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine and the Western community imposed sanctions on Russia and its subjects. Prospects for an 
export offensive was washed away by the incoming Russian recession and collapsing imports, the 
political and foreign policy costs of nurturing good relations with Moscow have increased dramatically 
overnight. Viktor Orbán’s grand opening became skewed. Having a good deal of irreversibility because 
of the Paks2 nuclear deal, he could not easily and potentially he did not want to retreat in his Russia 
policy. Perhaps Budapest even envisaged the new situation as a chance to struck better terms and get 
preferential treatment due to its tenacity. At the same time the short-term benefits were definitely 
gone and all what could be expected realistically, was some sort of Western-Russian settlement in the 
longer run or receiving some sort of reward from Moscow for Hungarian loyalty.  
In early 2019 none of these developments are to be seen. The end of the sanction policy does not 
seem to be closer than four years ago, Russia’s economy has been niggling, while instead of 
compensating Budapest for its loyalty, Moscow seems to be pushing for even more. Thus Hungary had 
to change to a more rationalistic approach and cautiously ease its ties with Russia, cooling down 
bilateral relations, even if without damaging its fundaments. The expected results have not been 
delivered even according to Fidesz’ utilitarian factors of success, on a „Hungary first” basis. The low-
hanging fruits have already been collected and there is nothing attractive what Russia may offer at the 
moment. At the same time there is not too much reason to publicly give up Russian cooperation, 
retreat from past commitments or even to launch a conflict again. Consequently, Hungary has been 
distancing itself from Russia in energy related matters in small steps, changed to a “wait and see” 
behavior and awaits new, positive impulses. Nonetheless, this detachment from Moscow remains 
highly difficult regarding the Paks2 nuclear issue and despite obvious progress, still hides a number of 
challenges in the gas sphere. 
 
From internal transformation to geopolitics – cooperation in the energy sector 
The new reality in the Hungarian energy sector 
Since the mid-1990s, when the Socialist-liberal coalition privatized large chunks of the energy industry 
and the utilities, multinational companies have been representing the system-building entities in the 
whole branch. Fidesz had consistently criticized the privatization and aimed to reestablish stricter 
state control over the sector. After 2010 PM Viktor Orbán marked out four sectors (banking, media, 
energy and retail), where he expected the domestic capital to take over the dominant positions from 
foreign ownership. Consequently the government gradually introduced a restrictive system of price 
and other controls, decreasing sectoral profitability. Simultaneously it expressed its wish to buy out 
the strategic parts of the branch from foreign multinationals. Except some tensions, the European 
Commission accepted the new regime, and only a few investigations were launched. 
Russia did not and does not have considerable assets in the Hungarian energy industry. While in the 
1990s Gazprom established a small foothold based on bilateral gas trade, this became largely 
insignificant by the late 2000s. The most notable case was the purchase of 21.2% of MOL (Hungarian 
oil and gas company) from OMV by Surgutneftegas in 2009. Nonetheless, this “adventure” was closed 
in 2011, when the Hungarian government bought these shares at a large premium. Thus Russia was 
directly not involved in Fidesz’ renationalization campaign. Energy relations to a large extent remained 
outside the bilateral political relations, since these were governed by private companies on the 
Hungarian side. Nevertheless, after 2013 energy came back as the central topic of Hungarian-Russian 
negotiations, enhanced by a massive state-ownership thorough the industry. 
While the years between 2010 and 2015 can be described as a transition from foreign-owned to 
renationalized energy systems in Hungary, after 2015 the sectoral landscape became relatively quiet. 
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By this time the majority of assets and exclusively all strategic companies were in state or domestic 
private ownership. The sector was strictly regulated especially as far as residential utility tariffs and 
ownership relations regarded. In a number of selected issues decision making was transferred to the 
Prime Minister’s Office. These include the Paks2 project entirely, which was separated from the 
existing nuclear industry, even from issues connected to the functioning Paks1 nuclear blocs. 
Questions related to natural gas imports and the long-term supply contract (LTSC), its renegotiation 
and the Russian pipeline projects were also delegated to the political level. Both PM Viktor Orbán and 
especially foreign minister Péter Szíjjártó actively discussed gas related matters with Gazprom and 
senior Russian officials. External gas policy dossiers were moved from ministries, responsible for 
energy industry to foreign ministry. 
 
Figure 2. Foreign multinationals adaptation strategies and state buy-outs between 2010-2015 
Source: Balázs Felsmann: “Corporate performance under institutional constraints”, Summary of Thesis269 
The new division of labor emblematically demonstrated both a veer away of the government’s 
attention from energy and a growing differentiation between its internal and external aspects. Given 
the change-over within the industry and its consolidation, energy policy required a less transformative 
approach and related decision making became a part of the daily routine. While the cabinet and 
especially the prime minister preserved their captivity regarding energy, their adherence became 
more geopolitical and outward. Practically this resulted in the separation of two major “assembly 
lines” within the sectoral decision making. Gas and nuclear issues, bearing more political and 
geopolitical content, were delegated to the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry. In other, primarily 
electricity-related issues, renewables and climate-matters, the responsible ministries could preserve 
much of their leverage and elaborate more policy-specific initiatives. 
                                                             
269 http://phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1009/13/Felsmann_Balazs_ten.pdf (18 March 2019). 
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It is important to underline that these later issues have been emerging as the main challenges for 
energy policy and security in particular. While gas policy issues are perceived as more or less regulated 
or manageable within the given ramifications, EU climate policies, energy transition and the region’s 
growing power generation scarcity puts electricity security into the spotlight. A critical decision will 
have to be made in the first half of the 2020s not only in Hungary, but also in a number of regional 
capitals. This trend diminishes the role of Russia in energy policy. Electricity imports come from the 
CEE region or Germany, renewable segments are totally independent from the Russia factor, 
regulation mainly comes from the European environment. It is very telling that the share of natural 
gas in Hungarian electricity generation fell from 38.3% to 14.5% between 2008 and 2014 (climbing 
back to 19.4% by 2017). Simultaneously the share of electricity imports increased from 9.5% in 2008 
to 28.3% in 2017270. This represents a major switch from Russian gas imports for power generation 
purposes to direct electricity imports from the EU.  
Currently optionality is given and imported electricity seem to be cheaper than gas imports for 
domestic generation. At the same time, it is highly questionable how long this situation can be 
sustained, whether the necessary investments will be made to maintain adequate power generation 
capacity in Europe. Nuclear fleets in France, Germany and CEE countries are about to be 
decommissioned due to political reasons or their end of their respective life-time. A growing number 
of national capitals declare their willingness to stop coal power generation in the foreseeable future 
due to climate considerations. All these trends create major uncertainty about the availability of cheap 
electricity on the EU markets in the years to come. In the Hungarian case the perceived emerging 
scarcity on the EU markets was a major reference point of the nuclear lobby in favor of the Paks2 
project, despite its anticipated high construction cost.  
The new settings of energy decision making, especially as far as its external aspects regarded, are 
much less transparent than previously. This was partly due to the steep decrease in the number of 
actors involved. There is no necessity to include companies, definitely not private or foreign owned 
corporations into the negotiations. Most of the discussions happen on a government-to-government 
basis, sometimes only with the minimal inclusion of state-owned companies. In the case of Paks2 
project, even this later actor was excluded, the Prime Minister’s Office directly coordinates it without 
any corporate representation. In the gas field, since October 2013271 negotiations regarding LTSC are 
conducted (besides the senior political level) between the respective two national champions, MVM 
and Gazprom. Gas pipeline matters require the inclusion of the gas TSO, FGSZ, owned partly by the 
state, partly by domestic private owners through its mother company, MOL. Gas wholesale trade has 
also been consolidated and the market was divided between two major companies. MET Hungary, a 
subsidiary of Swiss-based MET Holding AG supplies predominantly the industry and the competitive 
sectors, while MVMP, owned by MVM, serves the residential and public demand. Given its past 
ownership patterns and activity record, the MET Group, a medium-size energy trader within Europe, 
allegedly belongs to senior Hungarian private persons and decision makers. In this landscape PM 
Viktor Orbán can control any processes within the industry. 
MET International AG has become an important entity in another respect. While the holding was 
established as late as in 2010 in order to consolidate the MET Group’s gas purchases, its activity very 
rapidly went beyond the national and regional magnitude. Currently it works in 28 countries with 6.1 
bln EUR revenue. In 2017 it traded more than 35 bcm natural gas, started to invest intensively into gas 
and solar power generation assets. Simultaneously, the ownership structure has changed. The former 
Russian (Ilya Trubnikov) and Russia-related owners (Normestone), as well as those related to Viktor 
Orbán (István Garancsi, György Nagy) sold their shares to the management, first of all to CEO Benjámin 
Lakatos. Formally a major bank credit made it possible for the young CEO to buy the majority of the 
                                                             
270 „Data of the Hungarian Electricity System”, 2009 and 2017 yearbooks, Available at: 
https://www.mavir.hu/web/mavir/a-magyar-villamosenergia-rendszer-statisztikai-adatai (18 February 2019). 
271 In October 2013 the E.ON purchased the gas wholesaler, holding the Russian LTSC and the storage to state-
owned MVM. 
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company. Nonetheless, the company seems to have close relations with the current government and 
behaves like a national champion in Hungary related matters. It became a stakeholder in the Romanian 
Black-sea gas issue by allocating pipeline capacities along the route and also a shipper in the „South 
Stream lite” Bulgarian section. All this suggests that, while MET tries to distance its public image from 
the Hungarian government regarding its ownership matters, it still collects the benefits of Hungarian 
gas diplomacy. 
In the following pages three issues, analyzed in the previous edition of this report, will be reassessed. 
These are the Paks2 project, the evolving story of the new long-term gas supply contract (LTSC) with 
Gazprom and the highly relevant Romanian gas transit matter, and at last the issue of South Stream 
lite, stretching from Turkey to Hungary. The signs of a more cautious Hungarian approach, the end of 
high expectations from the Russian nexus are visible in all these cases. Nonetheless, Russia still can 
offer positive outcomes in the field of gas policy, thus Hungarian-Russian relations preserved much of 
their cooperative attitude. The changing logic of the relations is more visible in the nuclear field, where 
tensions are at hand, delays and some problems are publicly admitted. The gap between the 
respective motivations has widened in the last two years and Moscow may put an increasing pressure 
on Budapest in the years to come. 
 
The Paks2 project 
The Paks2 credit and construction contracts were signed in 2014-15 and envisaged the building of two 
1200 MW blocs by 2025-27 for 12.5 billion EUR. The Russian side also offered an industrial credit-line 
worth 10 billion EUR until 2025 at a fix, tiered interest rate between 3.9-4.9% and a 40% localization 
rate within Hungary. The characteristics of the deal are similar to other construction projects of 
Rosatom in Belarus, Finland or Vietnam. The deal was prepared in total secrecy on the political level 
in the second half of 2013, announced at PM Viktor Orbán’s visit in Moscow in January 2014. The 
government described the project as the „deal of the century”272, referring especially to the credit-
line agreement, which was described as highly attractive both in terms of size and interest rates. 
Preparations for the expansion of the nuclear plant were already ongoing during the socialist 
government, but at that time, foreseeing an international tender for the project. The swift and non-
transparent decision brought great criticism for the project from many actors, who warned that the it 
is a hotbed for corruption. Many saw this fear justified when PM Orbán’s former ally Lajos Simicska 
described in an interview for the news portal 24.hu how they prepared the takeover of the top 
commercial TV station RTL Klub. According to Simicska, Orban asked him about a possible price. “I told 
him I do not know but at first glance probably around 300 million Euro, 100 billion Forint, to which 
[Orbán] replied, ‘That’s no problem, Rosatom will buy it for me’.”273 Furthermore the fact that 
companies of Mr Simicska won procurements (future references) for works connected to the 
operating of the Paks power plant in 2013 supported the view that Paks2 will probably be an 
enourmous opportunity to channel public funds into the pockets of government-close oligarchs. 
The first couple of years were relatively silent in terms of project management. The contracts had to 
be approved by various EU bodies and from a number of different aspects. The European Commission 
investigated the project in three regards. The government refused to give the project to a separate 
corporate entity and kept it directly within the state administration, financing it from tax-payers 
money. This was an obvious case of state-aid, thus its effects on the market relations had to be 
assessed. The government argued that under the contractual conditions the project is profitable and 
would be desirable on a normal, private company basis. In its March 2017 decision, DG Competition 
                                                             
272 Among others: „A paksi bővítés az évszázad üzlete”, 17 February 2016, Available at: 
http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/a-paksi-bovites-az-evszazad-uzlete/ (20 February 2019). 
273 Benjamin Novak: Simicska: Orbán planned to buy out independent TV station with Russian money. 4 April 
2017, Budapest Beacon. Available: https://budapestbeacon.com/simicska-orban-planned-buy-independent-tv-
station-russian-money/  
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only partly accepted these arguments, gave the project a green light only under some specific 
conditions in order to avoid market distortions from state-aid274. 
In the case of public procurement (lack of tendering), the Commission started an infringement 
procedure, but closed it in November 2016. Hungary successfully applied the so called „technical 
exclusivity exemption”, proving that only one company can fulfill the technical and safety 
requirements275. This practice was often referred in French projects and shielded the Hungarian 
decision efficiently as a precedent. At the same time the project partners were obliged to tender the 
subcontracts as much as it is possible, but at least up to 55% of the project value. The third disputed 
element was the government bill accepted in March 2015, exempting the project, its past and future 
documentation from the Freedom of Information Act and classifying all information for 30 years. 
Nonetheless, this issue was not closely related to project management and the government had to 
gradually retreat in several respects under legal pressure. 
Thus by early 2017 the EC gave green light to the project and the construction depended exclusively 
on the two sides. One would have expected, that the permitting process will be relatively fast and 
preparatory construction works can begin in late-2017 – early 2018, as anticipated by senior 
governmental managers. At the same time by early 2019 Rosatom did not even submit the 
documentation for the permitting process. While all stakeholders deny the delay or refer to the EU 
approval process, the Hungarian side requested a renegotiation regarding the financial conditions. 
Problems around technical and regulatory details may have also surfaced, causing debates around the 
technological content of the contract. Currently no one expects the construction to start before late 
2020, causing articulated anger in Moscow but cautious silence in Budapest.  
As far as the financial conditions regarded, the Hungarian side publicly signaled its dissatisfaction with 
its interest rates. According to Hungarian governmental officials, more favorable financing is available 
on the market, thus Budapest would like to by-pass the Russian credit-line or renegotiate it276. In 
February 2017 Putin signaled that renegotiation is possible and offered some alternatives, among 
others proposed to raise the Russian credit from 80% share to 100% of the project value. Another 
related issue is the timing of the credit line, according to which repayment shall start no later than 
2026, independently from the status of the construction. Due to the obvious delay, this point shall 
also be modified, even if no information is available in this regard. It is not surprising that the 
Hungarian side has not taken significant amount of the credit-line, and even these sums were repaid 
as soon as possible. 
Nonetheless, the debates around the credit line represent the more visible, but less important 
disputes around the project. Technical and regulatory tensions may handicap the project management 
even more. Rosatom’s Finnish „twin-project” of the Paks expansion, the construction of the Hankihivi-
plant was postponed by four years until 2028. The local project company, Fennovoima, owned partly 
by Rosatom, could not prove the design’s safety at the Finnish nuclear regulator, STUK277. What is 
more, STUK ordered a confidential overview about the organizational and safety culture within the 
                                                             
274 „State Aid: Commission clears investment in construction of Paks II nuclear power plant in Hungary”, 
European Commission press release, 6 March 2017. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
464_en.htm (20 February 2019). 
275 „Hungary’s Paks II project clears procurement hurdle”, World Nuclear News, 22 November 2016. Available 
at: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Hungarys-Paks-II-project-clears-procurement-hurdle-
22111601.html (20 February 2019). 
276 „Minek kellett az orosz hitel, ha rögtön visszaadjuk?”, Index.hu, 7 February 2018, Available at: 
https://index.hu/gazdasag/2018/02/07/paks_orosz_hitel/ (20 February 2019). 
277 „Setback for nuclear industry as Hanhikivi Power Plant is delayed by a further four years”, Helsinki Times, 27 
December 2018, Available at: http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/16064-setback-for-
nuclear-industry-as-hanhikivi-power-plant-is-delayed-by-a-further-four-years.html (20 February 2019) 
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Russian nuclear industry. The report278 made alarming statements regarding the internal conditions 
and attitude towards safety. Partly on this basis STUK prolonged the permitting process by one year 
in 2017, and the Fennovoima consortium failed to deliver the necessary documentation even by this 
extended deadline.  
The Finnish and Hungarian reactors’ design, the AES-2006 model, had not been built at the time of 
contractual arrangements. Currently there are only two blocs that are on-line, the Novovoronezh II-1 
and the Leningrad II-1, both in Russia. There is little to be known about its safety and functioning, 
these gaps complicate the regulatory process significantly. European safety regulations represent 
another problem. Within the EU and especially after the 2011 Fukushima-disaster the safety 
regulations became considerably stricter, raising the project costs compared to non-EU projects. 
Russia has never constructed nuclear plants within the EU territory, in many regards this is a first 
encounter for them (except some life-time expansions and upgrading in the new EU-member states). 
It remains unclear whether these aspects are duly taken into account at the contracting. The criticism 
in these regards is dismissed by the Hungarian government, saying that two turnkey nuclear blocs 
have been purchased from Russia, all the delivery risk is on the supplier’s side. Nonetheless, the 
technical content has not been negotiated by the time of signature and there is no information how 
the contracts divide the related management and regulatory risks. Imre Mártha, former CEO of MVM 
Zrt., wrote in a leaked private letter to Mr Süli, minister in charge for the Paks2 investment in 2018 
that the Paks2 contract was a Russian dictate and that Russia is not in possession of designs for the 
plant that comply with European Union regulation. He also claimed that myriads of small technical 
details have to be changed to fulfill EU requirements and this boosts the project’s cost279. Indeed, in 
Vietnam Rosatom offered similar AES-2006 units at a 15-20% lower price, even if this happened some 
years before the Hungarian contract (in 2016 Vietnam denounced these projects). Thus these aspects 
may cause huge cost overruns and even derail the whole project. 
At the same time the delay and the obvious non-action of the last two years is very telling about the 
underlying major tensions within the project. The Russian side urges the Hungarian government to 
launch the construction process as soon as possible. According to Rosatom the permitting process can 
run parallel to the construction280, thus some works at the field could happen right now. Rosatom has 
already ordered the turbines and the process control system for approximately 1.3 billion EUR. 
Nonetheless, PM Viktor Orbán in September 2018 underlined that the deadlines were not as 
important, but the security and successful project management was crucial for all sides281. Until now, 
the spent funds have remained relatively small especially if compared to the total project value. This 
is the last point where the Hungarian government may „stand firm” without investing huge funds into 
an uncertain and highly risky endeavor. Consequently, Hungary’s play for time is understandable. 
For Russia the Paks2 project does not bear major financial risk. Even if according to the Hungarian 
sources Rosatom shall deliver two turnkey blocs by a particular deadline, little credibility can be given 
to these statements. The Russian side urges the launch of the construction, because its wish to reach 
a „point of no return” in the project. Rosatom has Hungary’s legal obligation, signed construction 
                                                             
278 Marja Ylonen, Heli Talja, Nadezhda Gotcheva and Merja Airola: „Evaluation of safety culture of the Hanhikivi-
1 project key organizations: Fennovoima, RAOS Project and Titan-2”, 13 March 2017, Available at: 
http://www.stuk.fi/documents/12547/207522/1731883-loppuraportti-fh1-turvallisuuskulttuurin-riippumaton-
arvio-2017-vtt-julkiset-osat.pdf/8fcdf721-52de-2e00-33ce-2486a75a7a91 (20 February 2019). 
279 Györgyi Balla: "Kedves Jani!" – a volt MVM-vezér utolsó figyelmeztetője a Paks II.-ért felelős Süli Jánosnak 20 
November 2018, hvg.hu, Available: 
https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20181120_paks_2_martha_imre_levele_suli_lajosnak  
280 András Szabó: „Kockázatos változtatásra készülnek Paks2-nél, ami az oroszoknak kedvezhet”, 22 February 
2019, Direkt36, Available: https://444.hu/2019/02/22/kockazatos-valtoztatasra-keszulnek-paks2-nel-ami-az-
oroszoknak-kedvezhet (24 February 2019). 
281 „Orbán Viktor - Vlagyimir Putyin sajtótájékoztató”, 18 September 2018, Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLo6rRlw320 (20 February 2019). 
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contracts and both their fulfillment or Budapest’s exit may bring them financial reward. If the Orbán-
government would like to postpone the project implementation, they can only hide behind regulatory 
details and refer to safety and technical weaknesses of the Russian design. 
 
Gas imports and the Romanian gas transit issue 
Hungary holds a long-term gas supply contract (LTSC) with Gazprom since 1994. The contract was 
originally signed for 20 years, but due to decreasing Hungarian import volumes and the Sides’ consent 
it has remained in force even today, until the end of 2020. It has been modified several times and 
these changes reflected both the evolving European gas market realities and the shifting political and 
local sectoral trends. Nonetheless, the sides would like to conclude a new LTSC, valid from 2021 and 
this is a major opportunity for a grand renegotiation of the terms. 
What makes this renegotiation process different from past rounds is the emergence of a new, 
medium-size source within the region: Romanian Black-sea shelf production may reach 6 bcm in the 
next 3-5 years. OMV and ExxonMobil develops the Domino and Pelican South gas fields, which hold 
proven reserves between 61 and 107 bcm combined. In order to market these volumes regionally, 
make them accessible outside Romania, the BRUA (an acronym for Black-sea-Romania-Hungary-
Austria) pipeline project was designed with a total future capacity of 4.4 bcm between the fields and 
the Austrian CEGH (Baumgarten) hub. This is a major European project of regional importance: more 
than half of the total investment cost for the Romanian section (479 million EUR) was provided by 
various grants and credits of European entities282. 
The two processes, the development of Romanian gas fields and the renegotiation of Russian LTSC 
affect the Hungarian medium-term gas futures tremendously and offer optionality in these regards. 
Prospective volumes from Romania roughly equal to the current amount of gas imported through the 
Russian LTSC (between 4.5 and 5 in 2016-18), diminishes Gazprom’s quasi-monopolistic market power 
and increases competition. Unlike Poland, a full offset of Russian gas imports is neither a goal, nor a 
possibility. What the Orbán-government would like to achieve, is the validation of its „Hungary first” 
principle, maximizing the sectoral and other economic benefits from this situation. This assumes 
relatively tough bargaining in both respects, in order to have the best terms possible. Nevertheless, 
the Orbán-government would like to maintain cooperation both with Gazprom and the Romanian 
Black-sea gas operators, ExxonMobil and OMV. 
The „Hungarian entry” into this regional gas game came in July 2017, when the gas TSO, FGSZ 
abandoned the original concept of BRUA. This assumed the building of a dedicated, new pipeline from 
the Romanian border to Austria. At the same time, according to FGSZ (gas TSO) the existing Hungarian 
network was sufficient to transit the whole volume through Hungary and Slovakia to Baumgarten. This 
argumentation rested on the fact that, despite the longer route, but through an already existing 
system, the transit capacities could be contracted long-term at competitive fees. Within the Hungarian 
gas community for many years the underutilization of the existing network has been the most onerous 
problem and the construction of a new pipeline seemed to be absurd. 
Nonetheless, the move enjoyed wider sectoral and political support. According to the original BRUA 
plans, the Hungarian role was constrained to transit and access to Romanian gas depended on 
negotiations with suppliers, most likely with OMV and ExxonMobil. The best what Hungary could hope 
for was some gas on a „Baumgarten netback” (the Baumgarten price minus some transit fees) basis. 
At the same time Hungary wanted to get better access to a larger amount of gas and even more 
importantly to play a distributor role within Central Europe. According to these arguments there was 
no sense to deliver natural gas to Austria back and forth, when it can be marketed in Hungary, Serbia, 
Croatia, Ukraine or Slovakia, markets lying much closer to the shipping route. Thus, even if the 
                                                             
282 Among others the EBRD, EIB and the Commission provided the funds. 
 76 
Hungarian section of the BRUA pipeline were built, its costs would be included into the gas price 
irrespective of its utilization and the real delivery services. 
PM Viktor Orbán also wanted to have a stronger bargaining position and use the transit leverage to 
the benefit of Hungarian companies. In this new setup the auctioning of the pipeline capacities, both 
at the Hungarian-Romanian and the Hungarian-Slovak border was managed within the Hungarian 
jurisdiction. The former was preliminary given to MET and MVM, two major players on the Hungarian 
market, while the latter was auctioned on a long-term basis for a variety of companies283. This is in 
contrast with the original BRUA-concept, envisaging collective auctioning of the total capacity likely to 
OMV and ExxonMobil. In this regard the two firms did not have other option than to negotiate about 
the terms of transit through Hungary and get access through the local auctioning procedures. The 
move was more painful for OMV, who had the marketing infrastructure within the region and wanted 
to boost its regional hub, the CEGH, by these incremental volumes. 
Both solutions have its benefits and risks. The original BRUA-project with its dedicated pipeline 
represents a more expensive model which likely brings the Romanian gas further away from the SEE 
and CEE regions. At the same time, it includes less stakeholders, provides marketing through 
established channels, even if these to a larger extent depend on the OMV’s economic interests. The 
alternative Hungarian proposal would potentially offer distribution within the region through the 
existing network with long-term contracting of the pipeline capacities. Gas can be potentially cheaper, 
but substantial volumes will remain in Hungary or will be marketed by Hungarian companies either. 
Instead of relying on the OMV’s financial rationale, PM Viktor Orbán and the Hungarian political-
economic reality may influence the means of marketing. 
The LTSC renegotiation process with Gazprom depends largely on the outcome of Romanian gas 
development prospects. In the past Hungary had an inflexible import volume necessity, consequently 
bargaining about prices and conditions was difficult and the negotiations one-sided. This may change, 
once Hungary will have contracts for Black-sea gas and access to its flows. Gazprom pricing may 
influence import volumes and Hungary can optimize its gas import policy better. Thus it is likely, that 
Budapest would like to harmonize the two processes. Thus hesitation about Romanian Black-sea gas 
development makes Budapest nervous and affects its Russia-connection indirectly. Much of the 
Hungarian anxiety regarding Romanian legal disputes are related to the growing time pressure284. 
Budapest shall conclude a new LTSC with Gazprom until the end of 2020 as latest, while the current 
postponement of Black-sea FIDs create a major source of uncertainty. 
The regional gas landscape may further improve due to the FID regarding the Krk LNG-terminal in 
Croatia in January 2019. The project failed to get enough bids for the capacity, thus it will be 
constructed on a non-market basis by significant EU-support (a grant of 101.4 mln EUR in 2017) and 
state-ownership. While Atlantic LNG prices are currently not competitive in CEE and the small capacity 
of the terminal (up to 2.6 bcma) is not a full-fledged alternative for current pipeline networks, the 
sheer existence of an access to this source may increase local resilience substantially. Fast construction 
of the Krk LNG-terminal may also bridge some of the delay in Black-sea gas development. 
 
 
                                                             
283 The Hungarian-Slovak cross-border capacity (4.3 bcma) was fully booked between 2022 and 2029 and partly 
until 2037. As for the Hungarian-Romanian cross border point, the preliminary booking procedure failed in 
December 2018, the respective companies gave back their offer due to the postponement of the Black-sea 
offshore gas FID decisions. 
284 In June 2018 foreign minister Péter Szíjártó called for increasing pressure on Romania to enable the 
development of the Black-sea deposits. „Román-magyar gázháború: sorsdöntő napok jönnek”, Portfolio.hu 
https://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/roman-magyar-gazhaboru-sorsdonto-napok-jonnek.291302.html (18 March 
2019). 
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The South Stream lite 
Despite the strong statements from the Kremlin regarding the cancellation of the South Stream 
pipeline after December 2014, the project has not disappeared totally in the subsequent years. In 
different names and forms (Tesla, development of national sections) the idea and some official 
discussion remained present within the region. Hungary has been actively involved in these 
preparations, even if its enthusiasm diminished to a certain extent. 
Despite Fidesz’ harsh criticism of the South Stream project in opposition prior to 2010, it became one 
of the pet projects in the Hungarian-Russian relations by 2014. Due to the fall of Nabucco-West in mid-
2012, South Stream remained the last transit project standing for Hungary. It promised a significant 
volume of annual transit around 30-32 bcma, 4-5 times the total import volume of the country. 
Budapest was in the midst of sensitive negotiations with Moscow, and South Stream seemed to be 
one of those few issues, where Hungary was on Russia’s demand side. Similar to Sofia and Belgrade, 
it also took a considerable conflict with the EU during the preparations and the cancellation of the 
project was a surprise for many decision makers. 
The cancellation, its unexpected announcement was a serious blow for Russia’s credibility in pipeline 
matters. In different ways, but this issue remained sensitive both in the Bulgarian and Serbian relations 
and handicapped further cooperation. Moscow tried to re-engage Belgrade and by-pass Sofia in mid-
2015 with some support from Budapest in the Tesla-project, unsuccessfully285. Gazprom was also 
occupied with the Nord Stream 2 project in these years, thus the SEE region remained relatively 
peaceful until late 2017.  
Hungary remained relatively supportive to Russian attempts to revitalize pipeline projects in the SEE 
region. PM Viktor Orbán critized the EU for the failure of the South Stream, especially when compared 
to Nord Stream construction works286. Hungary also tried to lobby for the Tesla-pipeline, allegedly 
proposed by Gazprom and interconnecting Turkey with Austria through Greece, Macedonia, Serbia 
and Hungary287. This pipeline would have facilitated both Azeri and Russian gas shipments to the 
North, but the initiative failed to get considerable support288. Not surprisingly in July 2017 FM Péter 
Szíjjártó signed a memorandum on establishing a cross-border capacity with Serbia in Moscow and 
announced Hungary’s readiness to join the Southern Gas Corridor after Bulgaria and Serbia289. This 
was Budapest’s formal move to join the activities that can be labeled as „South Stream lite”. Unlike 
South Stream, Gazprom’s current attempt rests on national sections and their respective regulation 
in national capitals. The total volume of shipment would be around the capacity of a single line of 
Turkstream, much below 16 bcma (at the Serbian-Hungarian border around 8 bcma), four times less 
than envisaged by South Stream a couple of years before. The project preparation keeps a very low 
profile, with much less visible representation from the Russian side. 
 
                                                             
285 „Greece, Serbia, Hungary, FYROM to sign memorandum on the construction of the pipeline, which should 
connect the Turkish Stream pipeline with Austria”, New Europe, 20 August 2015, Available from: 
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/russia-pushes-tesla-pipeline-through-balkans/ (24 February 2019). 
286 „Tárgyalások kezdődnek a 2021 utáni gázszállításról”, 2 February 2017, Available from: 
http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/hirek/megbecsulendo-a-magyar-orosz-egyuttmukodes (25 
February 2019). „Orbán Viktor kormánya az Északi Áramlat-2 pártján áll”, 28 August 2018, Available from: 
https://ujszo.com/gazdasag/orban-viktor-kormanya-az-eszaki-aramlat-2-partjan-all (25 February 2019). 
287 „CE/SEE Partners Eye EU Funds for Tesla Gas Pipeline Project”, Available from: https://www.iene.eu/cesee-
partners-eye-eu-funds-for-tesla-gas-pipeline-project-p2055.html (25 February 2019). 
288 Partly because of lack of credibility and also due to its high costs. 
289 „Szijjártó: 2019 végéig csatlakozunk a déli gázfolyosóhoz”, Available from: 
https://index.hu/gazdasag/energia/2017/07/05/szijjarto_2019_vegeig_csatlakozunk_a_deli_gazfolyosohoz/ (25 
February 2019). 
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Figure 3. Map: Pipelines in the Black-sea and SEE region (the discursive line through Bulgaria and Serbia 
represents the likely route for “South Stream lite”) 
Source: Platts 
Despite its supportive attitude, the Orbán-government’s expectations remained rather low regarding 
the Southern interconnection. One of the reasons is the small magnitude of this renewed effort: the 
total cross-border capacity established on the Southern border would equal to max. 8-9 bcma, only 
slightly more than the total Hungarian import volume. If we add that Hungary would lose Gazprom’s 
current transit to Serbia (between 1.5 and 2 bcma), no significant financial benefit will come from 
South Stream lite. Hungary may be supplied from the South instead of Ukraine, but transit volumes 
will be less than before. Second, unlike the situation in 2013-14, this time Hungary has a strong 
bargaining chip, the Black-sea gas. Budapest does not have to win Moscow’s goodwill so desperately, 
it has more autonomy to form its balance. Third, Hungary has already experienced both the fiasco of 
South Stream and Tesla in less than five years. Consequently there is considerable fatigue and inflated 
credibility of Russian pipeline projects. Budapest would like to see more action in Bulgaria and Serbia 
before taking final decisions in details. Gazprom’s low profile in the project does not help in this 
regard. 
Hungarian receptivity stems from a number of various considerations. The national gas community is 
satisfied with the current Ukrainian transit route, but cannot ignore the high level of uncertainty 
regarding its future. Nord Stream 2 is seen as a highly unfavorable route for future Hungarian supply: 
as many regional gas TSOs and companies, it has been feared that development costs and high 
German transit fees will increase the import prices in the longer run. Nord Stream 2 does not offer 
any benefit for Hungary and assumes a relatively costly network adaptation process. In March 2016 
the Hungarian government, together with seven other CEE states publicly criticized the Nord Stream 
2 initiative as being a risk for energy security within the region, destabilizing the geopolitical 
situation290. This move was further emphasized by regulative measures, not allowing the long-term 
auctioning for Gazprom of the Austrian-Hungarian and Slovak-Hungarian cross-border capacities. The 
later one would be needed for Romanian Black-sea gas exports in a reverse mode, thus making the 
two projects, Hungarian transit from Romania and supply from the Nord Stream 2 incompatible with 
                                                             
290 „EU leaders sign letter objecting to Nord Stream-2 gas link”, 16 March 2016, Reuters, Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-energy-nordstream/eu-leaders-sign-letter-objecting-to-nord-stream-2-
gas-link-idUKKCN0WI1YV (27 February 2019). 
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the current network. Practically this represents a considerable pressure on Gazprom to solve the 
Hungarian supply from other directions and leave the Nord Stream 2 option only for emergency cases.  
Thus „South Stream lite” and the related Turkstream project are perceived as the lesser of two evils. 
Understandably the Hungarian government cannot fully ignore Russia’s wish for alternative supply 
routes. At the same time it may set a number of conditions during its implementation. These include 
issues related to more favorable conditions regarding the LTSC conditions, ownership and marketing 
conditions of the new pipeline and the respective shipments, but also can ask for a considerable role 
in the project. For the later, the emergence of MET, the Hungary-related Swiss trader among the 
shippers of the Bulgarian section of „South Stream lite” are highly indicative in this regard291. 
 
Outlook 
Hungary’s moderate detachment from strong cooperation with Moscow is full of contradictions. Most 
importantly, the Orbán-government conducts this move only half-heartedly. Budapest continues its 
quest for bilateral economic and energy benefits and does not have clear priorities in the major 
sectoral issues. Furthermore, the current regional landscape and developments make good relations 
with Moscow and energy diversification barely reconcilable. Both the development of Romanian gas 
deposits and even the Croatian LNG-terminal imply considerable tensions with Gazprom. Certainly, 
Moscow will test Hungary’s resilience in these matters whether by sticks or carrots. It may be 
increasingly difficult for the Orbán-government to find a balance between old and new suppliers.The 
heavily criticized move to offer Budapest as the headquarters for the International Investment Bank292 
might be a step to compensate for the detachment in the energy sector. 
At the same time the current statist Hungarian sector hides a high number of vulnerabilities. It remains 
highly sensitive regarding price issues due to the government’s past populist measures in the 
residential sector. Current utility prices constitute a major political taboo, the government cannot 
raise the tariffs despite considerable increase in import prices. MVM weak financial liquidity and lack 
of funds for appropriate preparations for the winter seasons likely played a major role in Hungarian 
requests to use the Hungarian storage system by Gazprom in 2014 and 2017293. The autumn 2014 
supply cut on the Hungarian-Ukrainian border may have also been related to Moscow’s requests, 
while there were no technical reasons for it294. Nevertheless, the Paks2 deal remains by far the biggest 
bugset of management problems. Obviously the Hungarian government realized the challenges of the 
projects and would like to retreat in many regards. At the same time most of the contracts have been 
already signed, thus any kind of postponement or cancellation means an uphill battle for Budapest.  
In the current centralized design, all these issues are interrelated. It was PM Viktor Orbán who wanted 
to raise all these energy issues to the highest bilateral level. Accordingly, he has to take the 
responsibility for all the negative developments and Moscow’s criticism. Not surprisingly, bilateral 
relations have been hollowing for a while and Budapest actively tries to decrease their intensity. While 
Putin and Orbán met twice both in 2017 and 2018, their 2019 meeting has been postponed until 
                                                             
291 „Bulgaria will build pipeline to transport Russian gas”, 31 January 2019, Reuters, Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/bulgaria-gas/update-1-bulgaria-will-build-pipeline-to-transport-russian-gas-
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Hungarian side. 
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autumn, allegedly because of Hungarian request. It still has to be seen, how Hungary can benefit from 
the most advantageous regional gas landscape for decades, bearing all the burden of its past 
commitments to Moscow. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
- Besides infrastructure development, the EC shall turn more intensively towards major local 
production projects. It may provide a broader set of technical and consultancy support from an 
earlier phase. While these remain sensitive issues, early-phase support on expert or administrative 
level may facilitate better outcomes later, on the political level. This activity may be transferred 
also to the Energy Community and achieve broader geographic cover. 
- The EU shall consider what it can do in order to decrease uncertainty regarding medium- and 
long-term planning in the gas and particularly in the electricity sectors. While uncertainty is a 
major issue everywhere in the continent, it may raise future energy prices and in CEE and SEE 
region it constitutes a major asset for Russian (and in some cases Chinese) influence. Fears from 
future electricity supply scarcity increases self-sufficiency ambitions, opening major windows for 
Moscow. 
- Demand-management and policies regarding efficiency remain very weak through the region. 
Arguments about future demand growth and supply-driven logic in energy policy favors Russian 
presence. The EC shall start more dedicated efforts in order to achieve shifts in regional sectoral 
planning and bring best practices from more progressive countries to these national capitals. 
- Direct funds towards renewable energies, regional EU energy projects can contribute to 
diversifying the energy portfolios of EU MSs, strengthen ties/dependencies within EU countries 
stronger. 
  
